embers of social networks are given opportunities to bestow positive recognition upon one another by means of constructs such as "likes" and "retweets." Although recipients no doubt experience utility from these actions, one might question why these constructs with no intrinsic value for the sender are exchanged at all. Here we formulate a metric for the prestige of a member of a social network based on his or her place within the network and the rate at which "likes" are exchanged within his or her social circle. Simulation reveals that the 1% most strategicallyoptimized networks exchange likes at an average rate 23.5% higher than that of their random counterparts. This suggests that purely strategic agents, even with no concern for altruism or the general welfare, experience utility from giving social gratification. Further, we show that prestige-maximization creates a selective pressure for structural features associated with social networks including clustering and the small-world property.
Introduction
Measures of prestige in social network theory typically rely on features of the network structure itself including, for instance, closeness centrality, betweenness centrality, and eigenvector centrality. [1] These neglect that in many applications an actor's prestige depends not only on the quantity or quality of connections (as in the degree and eigenvector models, respectively) but also the nature of the interactions between connected nodes. Actors may be differentially endorsed by those with whom they are connected; thus each must strategize to allocate endorsements in the way that maximizes his or her own prestige. Such a system is clearly in effect in the online social network (OSN) where users may bestow recognition upon those with whom they are connected in the form of a "like," "share," "retweet," etc. [2, 3] Here we will examine the strategy involved in the endowment of "likes" which are of particular interest because to give one neither demands an explicit cost nor provides an explicit benefit to the giver. Nonetheless, transfers of social gratification behave as though they are scarce, raising the question of how and why they are traded within an OSN and what large-scale behaviors should emerge when network participants exchange "likes" in such a way that they strategically maximize their prestige.
Like Centrality
Consider a network of n actors who are connected according to an adjacency matrix F which satisfies F ij = 1 if i and j are "friends" 0 otherwise (1) where friendship is considered neither directed nor reflexive; thus F is symmetric and hollow. Suppose that each member i produces a stream of social declarations, or "posts" for which an actor j may declare approval in the form of a "like" when f ij = 1. Let r ij be the rate at which the actor j endows likes upon i. Next define the like centrality (LC) of i to be the sum of the rates at which i's friends like i's posts, scaled by each of their own LCs, all normalized by the sum of i's friends' LCs. That is,
The motivation of i is then to improve his or her friends' prestiges so as to inflate the efficacies of the likes he receives, but not to the extent that it drives up the average neighbors' prestige and belittles i by comparison. This metric resembles eigenvector centrality conceptually in that one's own centrality is proportional to the sum of those of his or her friends, though its quadratic nature makes it dissimilar computationally. When each actor is minimizing his or her own LC, ∂L i /∂r ki = 0 for all connected i and k. That allows (2) to be rearranged and implicitly differentiated to give
for all k connected to i. A mean field approximation in which an individual's LC depends only on those with whom he or she is immediately connected yields a system in which a given person receives likes at the same rate from all his friends; that is, all the nonzero elements of each row of the r matrix are equal. (2) must then reduce to L i = r ij for all j that are connected to i. In the next section we will examine the exact system without the approximation.
OSN Simulation
We begin by generating 500,000 random graphs of size n = 10 using a Barabási-Albert algorithm in which new vertices are added with two edges. [4] This model is chosen to simulate features of real OSN including, for instance, preferential attachment, small average path length, and high clustering. Each directed connection is assigned a uniformly-distributed random post rate between 0 and 1. The likeness centrality of each actor is then computed by numerically solving (2) which yields for each network a system of 10 quadratic equations in 10 variables. 1 The optimalities of the whole networks are computed as the sums of the LCs of their individual members. This quantity appears to precisely follow a Gaussian distribution whose log-likelihood is maximized when µ = 5.0000 and σ 2 = 0.3142 which coincide with the raw moments of the data. The top 1% (approximately 5000) most prestigious networks are selected to represent the most effective LC-maximizing agents. It would be insufficient to consider only individuals of high prestige because those with whom they are interacting would not necessarily be acting strategically.
Like Endowment
We inquire as to whether strategic agents benefit from giving likes. As seen in Figure 1 , agents in optimal networks allocate 23.5% more likes than their random counterparts. The difference is manifested in the heavier tail 2 of the strategic curve, suggesting that LC-maximizing networks contain a larger proportion of highly-generous agents. We can also predict with high accuracy the ideal rate for an individual to give likes given his or her location within the network. Averaging the rate at which likes are given by actors of each possible degree centrality, regression yields likes given = −1.599 + 0.6635 × degree centrality with R 2 > 0.9999. Without averaging, R 2 = 0.9603 and a scattered residual plot confirms that a linear fit is appropriate. The same comparison is shown in Figure 2 but for betweenness, closeness, and eigenvector centralities. The deviation from the mean field approximation L i = r ij can be tested based on the simulation data. In particular, we compute for the strategic networks the distribution of the statistic r ij /L i − 1, which we call δ ij , for all connected i and j. The probability density function for δ is depicted in the first histogram of Figure 3 . We see then that although there appears to be a cusp at δ = 0, the number of likes received by an actor can be more than double his or her like centrality. Next consider an error metric ij = r ij −L i . Using this to eliminate r ij in (2) and rearranging yields
which is trivially true in the mean field case but must also apply in general. We now examine the distribution of the ij , shown in the second histogram of Figure 3 . This reveals a remarkable bimodal distribu- tion in which the mean field peak at = 0 is smaller than an additional nontrivial extremum at ≈ −0.64. That is, there is a strong tendency, exhibited by 82% of the rational agents, to enjoy a like centrality higher than what would be predicted based on their likereceiving rate and the mean field approximation. It must be concluded that it is insufficient for strategic individuals to assume that their activity only affects their immediate neighbors in the network; the inaccuracy of the approximation illustrates that social influence spreads non-negligibly to friends-of-friends and perhaps beyond.
Emergent Network Features
For every sample in the simulation described above, a new network is randomly generated. Therefore, it has the power to test the fitness of not only the allocation of likes as detailed above, but also the structure of the underlying network. Here we present a comparison between two network properties generated by strategic and random methods: clustering and small diameter, which are both known features of networks in a wide variety of applications.
Clustering
In the manner of Watts and Strogatz, [5] define C, the local clustering coefficient for a vertex v, the proportion of the potential connections between v's friends Figure 3 : Distribution of δ-and -type deviations from the mean field approximation of strategic behavior.
which are included in the network. The mean clustering coefficientC is then defined as the average of the local coefficients over the entire network and acts as a metric for the tendency of cliques to form, as they do in real social networks. It is observed that strategic networks tend to have higher mean clustering coefficients than random ones. Histogram bin counts for the probability density functions are compared between the two populations and displayed in Figure 4 . Probability differences are given as percent differences from random to strategic, so a positive quantity indicates that the given level of clustering occurs more frequently in strategic systems.
Diameter
The diameter of a network is defined as the maximum of all the network's geodesic path lengths between pairs of nodes. The nature of the Barabási-Albert algorithm with the simulation's particular parameters allow only networks of diameters 2, 3, and 4 to occur with non-negligible probability. Figure 5 shows that higher-prestige networks tend to be associated with lower-diameter networks-that is, shorter path lengths. This and the observation that strategic networks tend to have higher clustering suggest that a pursuit of like centrality can account for high clustering and low diameter, two features known to be characteristic of real-world social networks.
Discussion
We have shown that like centrality-motivated agents tend to exhibit many of the behaviors associated with actual social actors. The struggle to maximize the rate at which one receives gratification relative to his or her social neighbors results in a system in which strategic agents exchange likes at finite rates, consistent with observations of online social networking. It also enforces network geometries in which the probabilities that those who share mutual friends are likely to meet (high clustering) and that there exist edges which connect distant parts of the network (small world). The notion of prestige optimization assumed here is not novel; it is well-documented that the pursuit of prestige and honor with respect to cultural norms can be a powerful social force. [6] It would be expected then, especially among youthful coteries for which a significant portion of social discourse occurs online, that users of Facebook and other social websites behave according to an objective function such as like centrality. This raises the possibility of determining the precise degree to which like allocation is motivated by Machiavellian strategy rather than an effectively random criterion such as the degree to which the liker approves of the post in question. Techniques like this have been used before and have been successful in elucidating network formation processes. [7] 
